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Some philosophers have argued that evidence of underlying mechanisms does not
provide evidence for the effectiveness of a medical intervention. One such argument
appeals to the unreliability of mechanistic reasoning. However, mechanistic reasoning
is not the only way that evidence of mechanisms might provide evidence of effective-
ness. A more reliable type of reasoning may be distinguished by appealing to recent
work on evidential pluralism in the epistemology of medicine. A case study from virol-
ogy provides an example of this so‐called reinforced reasoning in medicine. It is argued
that in this case study, the available evidence of underlying mechanisms did in fact
play a role in providing evidence in favour of a medical intervention. This paper there-
fore adds a novel and recent case study to the literature in support of evidential plu-
ralism in medicine.
KEYWORDS
evidence‐based medicine, evidential pluralism, mechanisms, mechanistic reasoning, reinforced
reasoning, virology1 | INTRODUCTION
A mechanism is a structure that performs some regular function by
means of its component entities, activities, and their organization.1 A
distinction is sometimes made between evidence of underlying mecha-
nisms and mechanistic evidence for the effectiveness of a medical inter-
vention (p123).2 Given a particular medical intervention, it is possible
to have strong evidence of the underlying entities and activities
involved in its mechanism of action without any evidence on this basis
that the intervention is effective. However, evidential pluralists have
argued that evidence of underlying mechanisms can sometimes pro-
vide mechanistic evidence, at least when the evidence of mechanisms
is taken together with other types of evidence, for example, evidence
of correlation from comparative clinical studies.3 Against this, some
have argued that evidence of underlying mechanisms does not provide
mechanistic evidence for the effectiveness of medical interventions.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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2 AUKER‐HOWLETT AND WILDE2 | MECHANISTIC REASONING AND
MECHANISTIC EVIDENCE
A prominent criticism of evidence‐based medicine is that it downplays
the research into pathophysiological mechanisms provided by the basic
sciences.9 At best, this research figures on the lowest levels of the hier-
archies ranking the quality of evidence for medical interventions (pp83‐
87).9Miriam Solomon has argued that there is a good reason to be skep-
tical about the role of basic science research in providing evidence for
the effectiveness of medical interventions, namely, that “[t]here are
countless examples of proposed interventions that make scientific
sense and sometimes even work in vitro or in animal studies, but which
turn out to be ineffective in humans” (p117).2 As an example, she talks
about the false prediction that oestrogens would decrease the inci-
dence of cardiac mortality, which was a prediction based upon the the-
ory that oestrogens would lower the lipid concentration of the blood.
Importantly, this was a false prediction based upon mechanistic reason-
ing, where mechanistic reasoning is the process of making a claim that
an intervention will cause a particular effect on the basis of evidence
of the underlying mechanisms (pp124‐130).10 (It is important to note
that this definition of mechanistic reasoning requires evidence of the
underlying mechanisms rather than simply a psychologically compelling
storyof amechanism [pp349‐350].)3 Solomon thinks that this poor track
record confirms that mechanistic reasoning does not provide evidence
for the effectiveness of a medical intervention (p126).2 However, Solo-
mon also recognizes the concern that downplaying the role of the basic
sciences in evidence‐based medicine may result in overlooking an
important source of information (pp119‐120).2 The question then is
how to reconcile the supposed importance of the role of the basic sci-
ences in evidence‐based medicine with the apparent low reliability of
mechanistic reasoning.
One way to reconcile these lines of thought is to maintain that
mechanistic reasoning fulfils an important non‐evidential role in a more
complete epistemology of medicine than that articulated by current
evidence‐based medicine. Let us call this the non‐evidential approach
to mechanistic reasoning. This is the approach that is preferred by Solo-
mon (p124).2 She thinks that mechanistic reasoning informed by basic
science research is clearly important in medicine but that such reason-
ing provides no evidence for the effectiveness of a medical interven-
tion. Given this, it must be that mechanistic reasoning is playing some
other important but non‐evidential role. Solomon maintains that the
important role for mechanistic reasoning is simply to propose medical
interventions, which are then evaluated in terms of their effectiveness
by themethods of evidence‐basedmedicine (p132).2 She says that “evi-
dence‐based medicine should not discount mechanistic reasoning,
unless it wants to bite the hand that feeds it” (p125).2
Solomon refers to the distinction between the context of discovery
and the context of justification. This distinction is often traced back to
the work of Hans Reichenbach.11 Broadly speaking, a scientific theory
may be proposed by any method in the context of discovery, because
it is evaluated in terms of its evidential standing in the separate con-
text of justification. Solomon thinks that this distinction is helpful in
providing an explication of the non‐evidential role for mechanisticreasoning in medicine. In particular, mechanistic reasoning is at home
in the context of discovery, since it is a method by which a medical
intervention may be proposed that need not thereby provide any jus-
tification for the effectiveness of that intervention. However, this is
not a problem because there are also the methods of evidence‐based
medicine, such as comparative clinical studies, that can evaluate the
effectiveness of the proposed medical intervention in the separate
context of justification. A more complete epistemology of medicine
therefore finds a home for mechanistic reasoning within the context
of discovery and a home for the methods of evidence‐based medicine
within the context of justification, at least according to Solomon
(pp124‐126).2 Given this, a distinct type of reasoning may be intro-
duced by analogy to mechanistic reasoning: A comparative study
may provide evidence of the existence of a correlation between an
intervention and a positive health outcome, and correlational reasoning
is the process of making a claim about the effectiveness of a medical
intervention on the basis of such evidence of correlation. Indeed, Sol-
omon says that “[h]ealth care interventions are judged effective when
there is a correlation between the intervention and positive outcomes.
Often it is not too much of a leap to infer that the intervention causes
the positive outcome” (p117).2 This appeal to correlational reasoning
gives the methods of evidence‐based medicine their proper role in
providing evidence for the effectiveness of medical interventions
without downplaying the methods of mechanistic reasoning from the
basic sciences, which remain important in proposing potentially effec-
tive medical interventions.
Solomon acknowledges that the distinction between the context
of discovery and the context of justification characterizes a romantic
view of science. She says that “[s]ince the time of the logical empiri-
cists, we have come to appreciate that the context of justification is
not so rigorous, and that the context of discovery is not so uncon-
strained” (p125).2 Indeed, Daniel Steel also remarks that “[c]urrent dis-
cussions of the distinction in the philosophy of science literature take
it as more or less given that aspects of the discovery process can be
relevant to the assessment of hypotheses, and then proceed to con-
sider the finer points of proposals about how this is so” (p97).12 In
other words, the process by which a claim is proposed may be relevant
to the level of justification of that claim. In particular, it may be that
more informed mechanistic reasoning will lead to the proposal of a
better justified claim about the effectiveness of a medical interven-
tion. Indeed, Solomon herself says elsewhere that “the more we know
about basic and other mechanisms, … the more likely we are to make
accurate predictions and avoid drug failure by focusing on those inter-
ventions with the greatest probability of success” (p175).2
An alternative approach therefore maintains that certain instances
of mechanistic reasoning can provide some evidence for the effective-
ness of a medical intervention. Let us call this the evidential approach
to mechanistic reasoning. This is the approach taken by Jeremy
Howick.10,13,14 He acknowledges that some instances of mechanistic
reasoning have led to harmful false predictions about the effective-
ness of medical interventions (pp154‐157).10 However, Howick thinks
that these false predictions were brought about by low‐quality mecha-
nistic reasoning, because that reasoning was based upon insufficiently
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soning based on partially understood mechanisms will not provide reli-
able evidence that an intervention caused a patient relevant outcome”
(p139).10 Howick maintains that high‐quality mechanistic reasoning
should be distinguished from low‐quality mechanistic reasoning,
where mechanistic reasoning is high quality when it is based upon suf-
ficiently complete knowledge of the relevant mechanisms and their
behaviour under intervention (pp937‐938).13 He thinks that “if our
knowledge of mechanisms is to count as reliable evidence, we need
to know enough about the relevant mechanisms to predict how they
will react to novel medical interventions” (pp129‐130).10 Of course,
it is acknowledged that “there is much to stand in the way of mecha-
nistic reasoning being of high quality since there are limits to our
knowledge of bodily mechanisms and their interactions” (p939).13
However, Howick does also provide examples to suggest that “high‐
quality mechanistic reasoning can provide reliable evidence that a
treatment is effective” (p145).10
Solomon argues that this evidential approach conflates evidence of
the underlying mechanisms with mechanistic evidence, where mecha-
nistic evidence is any evidence about the effectiveness of a medical
intervention that is provided by mechanistic reasoning (p123).2 She
thinks that evidence of the underlying mechanisms does not provide
mechanistic evidence that an intervention will be effective: “We could
have strong evidence that the mechanisms operate, yet no evidence
(or the weakest of evidence) that a particular proposed therapy will
have the desired effect” (p123).2 Solomon gives the example of hor-
mone replacement therapy: “We had strong evidence of hormonal
effects on blood lipids, but weak (perhaps even no) evidence that this
clinical intervention would reduce cardiac mortality, because we did
not have full knowledge of the relevant complexity of the mecha-
nisms” (p123).2 In other words, the reasoning based upon this evi-
dence provided no mechanistic evidence that oestrogens would
decrease the incidence of cardiac mortality. Her worry is that the com-
plexity of pathophysiological mechanisms means that mechanistic rea-
soning does not determine the overall effect of a medical intervention
because the reasoning is typically based upon incomplete evidence of
the underlying mechanisms (pp131‐132)2:A general problem with mechanistic accounts is that they
are typically incomplete, although they often give an
illusion of a complete, often linear, narrative.
Incompleteness is the consequence of there being
mechanisms underlying mechanisms, mechanisms
inserted into mechanisms, background mechanisms that
can fill out the mechanistic story, and mechanisms that
can hijack regular mechanisms. That is, there is complex
interaction of multiple mechanisms in a chaotic and
multidimensional system. There are possible hidden
mechanisms everywhere in mechanistic stories, despite
an easy impression of narrative or causal completeness.
Since we do not have a theory of everything, it is not
possible to know in advance whether or not a particular
mechanistic intervention will have the intended result.Solomon even suggests that in the case of cystic fibrosis, as the
evidence of the underlying mechanisms increased, this only served
to stand in the way of providing mechanistic evidence for the effec-
tiveness of an intervention because it revealed the high level of com-
plexity of those mechanisms (pp126‐132).2 The idea is that such
complexity means that evidence of underlying mechanisms will never
be sufficiently complete to play a role in an instance of mechanistic
reasoning that could provide any mechanistic evidence for the effec-
tiveness of a medical intervention.
Is this a good reason to think that evidence of underlying mechanisms
cannot provide evidence for the effectiveness of a medical intervention?
At best, it has been shown that standalone mechanistic reasoning can-
not provide evidence for the effectiveness of a medical intervention.
However, evidence of underlying mechanisms may still provide evi-
dence of effectiveness by playing a role in an alternative reasoning
process. Indeed, evidential pluralists have argued that evidence of
underlying mechanisms can provide mechanistic evidence for the
effectiveness of a medical intervention, at least when it is taken
together with other types of evidence, for example, evidence of corre-
lation from comparative clinical studies.3-8 Evidential pluralists empha-
size the complimentary nature of evidence of mechanisms and
evidence of correlation (p351)3:Evidence of a linking mechanism helps show that the
overall relationship between A and B is genuinely
causal. But evidence of correlation helps to determine
the net effect of a mechanism, and to show that it is
not masked by further unknown mechanisms. Together,
evidence of these two different things is very much
stronger than evidence of one alone.The basic idea is that each type of evidence comes with its own
characteristic weakness for reasoning about the effectiveness of a
medical intervention. On the one hand, thanks to the complexity of
the underlying mechanisms, it can be difficult to determine the overall
effect of a medical intervention on the basis of evidence of underlying
mechanisms alone. On the other hand, it can be difficult to determine
whether an observed correlation is causal on the basis of evidence of
correlation alone. This is the familiar claim that correlation is not cau-
sation. However, evidence of an underlying mechanism that explains
the extent of the observed correlation can help to address the charac-
teristic weakness of evidence of correlation by making more plausible
a causal interpretation of the correlation. And evidence of correlation
helps to address the characteristic weakness of evidence of mecha-
nisms by giving evidence of an overall effect.5 Clarke et al3 draw an
analogy with reinforced concrete (p351):[I]f steel is placed in concrete to produce reinforced
concrete, we get a composite material where the
concrete resists the compression and the steel resists
the tension. The combination of two different materials
produces a material that is much stronger than either of
its components. In the same way, we argue that it is
the combination of two different types of evidence
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would either type of evidence on its own. The important
point is that this depends on the evidence being
evidence of two types of things–correlations and
mechanisms–that are different in character.They say that “[t]ogether, evidence of these two different things is
very much stronger than evidence of one alone” (p351).3 The point is
that there are problems with reasoning about the effectiveness of a
medical intervention on the basis of either underlying mechanisms or
correlations alone. In other words, there are problems with both
mechanistic and correlational reasoning. However, these problems
may be addressed by adopting a type of evidential pluralism.
This evidential pluralism allows a novel type of reasoning in medi-
cine to be introduced in contrast to both mechanistic and correlational
reasoning. Reinforced reasoning is the process of making a claim about
the effectiveness of a medical intervention on the basis of both evi-
dence of a correlation and evidence of the underlying mechanisms.
Importantly, it is plausible that reinforced reasoning does not share
the weaknesses of mechanistic and correlational reasoning for draw-
ing conclusions about the effectiveness of a medical intervention. In
particular, this type of reasoning helps to address the characteristic
weaknesses of both mechanistic and correlational reasoning by com-
bining evidence of underlying mechanisms together with evidence of
correlation. Reinforced reasoning therefore promises to be a process
by which evidence of the underlying mechanisms may provide evi-
dence in favour of the effectiveness of a medical intervention.
To sum up, it has been argued in this section that the present
objection to mechanistic reasoning leaves untouched an alternative
possible way that evidence of underlying mechanisms may provide
evidence for the effectiveness of a medical intervention. Of course,
it has not yet been shown that this alternative reinforced reasoning
can in fact provide some evidence of effectiveness, that is, mechanis-
tic evidence of effectiveness. In the next section, it will therefore be
argued that a case study from virology provides a clear example of
the differences between correlational, mechanistic, and reinforced
reasoning in medicine. It will be argued that this case study demon-
strates that evidence of mechanisms can in fact provide evidence for
the effectiveness of a medical intervention by playing a role in an
instance of reinforced reasoning.3 | A CASE STUDY IN VIROLOGY
Hepatitis C is a liver disease caused by infection from a single‐
stranded, blood‐borne RNA flavivirus known as HCV.15 In some
patients, an innate immune response is enough to clear this infection
within a few months, whereas other patients go on to develop a
chronic version of the infection. This chronic infection is a major cause
of liver cancer and other diseases.16
A short time ago, the recommended optimal treatment for the
chronic disease was a combination therapy of interferon alfa and riba-
virin. Interferons are a family of cytokines that are a key component of
the innate immune response against viruses. Interferons bind withreceptors on the cell surface, leading to the expression of genes that
prevent virus replication, facilitate viral clearance, and initiate the pro-
tection of neighbouring cells from further viral infection.17 However,
viruses can produce accessory proteins to avoid or downregulate this
immune response by inhibiting the expression of interferons.18 The
idea is that this action may be countered by not relying solely on host
expression and instead administering exogenous interferons.19 Indeed,
a systematic review of randomized trials helped to establish that inter-
feron monotherapy leads to an improvement in sustained virological
response, defined as there being no detectable HCV RNA in blood
tests after 6 months.20 Other trials helped to establish also that
greater improvements in sustained virological response are achieved
by combining interferons with a drug called ribavirin.21,22 Ribavirin is
a nucleoside analogue that is typically used as a broad‐spectrum anti-
viral based upon its demonstrated efficacy against viral replication for
other viruses.23
Recently, there was a change in the recommended optimal treat-
ment from the standard combination therapy to a pegylated combina-
tion therapy of peginterferon alfa and ribavirin, where pegylation
aims to improve the therapeutic potential of the interferon by
attaching to it a water‐soluble polymer called polyethylene glycol
(PEG).24 It has been argued that this change in recommendation was
the result of evidence for the increased effectiveness of pegylated
combination therapy compared with the standard combination ther-
apy.16 What was the reasoning that justified this change in
recommendation?
A proponent of mechanistic reasoning may say that the change in
recommendation was justified on the basis of evidence of the under-
lying mechanisms linking pegylated combination therapy to an
improvement in rates of sustained virological response compared with
the standard combination therapy. An acknowledged shortcoming of
standard interferon therapy is that the antiviral activity of interferons
is limited by the fact that they only remain in the body for a short
amount of time.25-27 Indeed, even on three doses of interferon per
week, there will be two days of the week in which there is no clinically
relevant drug concentration (p230).25 This is a particular problem
given the rapid rate of replication of HCV.28 However, there is good
evidence of a couple of mechanisms by which pegylation prolongs
the biological half‐life of interferons, that is, the time it takes biological
processes to remove half of the substance.27,29,30 In particular,
pegylation prolongs the half‐life of the interferon by increasing its
effective size, thereby decreasing renal and cell clearance. In addition,
pegylation disrupts enzyme activity, which also prolongs the half‐life
of the interferon by decreasing proteolysis. In turn, this prolonging
of half‐life increases the bioavailability of interferons, potentially
improving antiviral activity by permitting more sustained pressure on
the virus. Indeed, clinically significant serum levels of peginterferon
have been detected up to a week after administration.30 On the basis
of this evidence of the different pharmacokinetic effects of pegylated
and standard combination therapy, the proponent of mechanistic rea-
soning may claim that there is mechanistic evidence for the greater
effectiveness of pegylated combination therapy compared with stan-
dard combination therapy.
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no mechanistic evidence that pegylated combination therapy is more
effective than the standard combination therapy at improving rates
of sustained virological response. Although there is evidence of the
underlying mechanisms linking pegylated combination therapy to
increased antiviral activity, there is the same worry as discussed
above, namely, that the complexity of the relevant mechanisms is
not well understood. In particular, there may be other unknown, com-
plicating mechanisms that make it difficult to determine any overall
increased beneficial effect for pegylated combination therapy. For
example, a standard problem for pegylated therapeutics is that
increasing the size of a protein through pegylation has been shown
to reduce its biological activity by disrupting the ability of the protein
to bind with the relevant receptor.29 It may be that this reduction in
biological activity will outweigh any additional beneficial effect due
to pegylation. It is for this reason that it is widely acknowledged that
“the net biologic activity of each particular PEGylated product may
be difficult, if not impossible to predict” (p33).27
Of course, the fact that this standalone mechanistic reasoning did
not provide mechanistic evidence for the increased effectiveness of
the pegylated combination therapy is unlikely to come as a surprise
to the critic of the evidential approach to mechanistic reasoning: It is
simply another case where incomplete knowledge of the complexity
of the underlying mechanisms precludes providing evidence of an over-
all beneficial effect. The case provides further evidence that mechanis-
tic reasoning is at home in the context of discovery rather than the
context of justification. Instead, the critic might recommend looking
towards evidence of correlation in order to provide this evidence of a
beneficial effect, where this evidence of correlation is typically
obtained from comparative studies (pp124‐125).2 They might say that
the change in recommendation from standard to pegylated combina-
tion therapy was based upon evidence of a correlation between
pegylated combination therapy and improved rates of sustained viro-
logical response. In other words, the change in recommendation was
justified on the basis of standalone correlational reasoning.
Unfortunately, it also looks like the change in recommendation was
not justified solely on the basis of correlational reasoning. A number of
randomized trials had concluded that pegylated combination therapy
was correlated with a statistically significant improvement in rates of
sustained virological response when compared with the standard com-
bination therapy.31-33 A later systematic review of 27 randomized clin-
ical trials agreed that pegylated combination therapy is correlatedwith a
significant improvement in rates of sustained virological response.34
However, the question is whether this correlation is explained by the
increased causal effectiveness of the pegylated combination therapy
compared with the standard combination therapy. It may be that there
are more plausible alternative explanations of the observed correlation,
such as bias in the available trials. Indeed, the systematic review also
concluded that therewas onlymoderate evidence of the increased effec-
tiveness of pegylated combination therapy (p23).34 All trials included in
the reviewwere considered to have a high risk of bias, that is, a propen-
sity to overestimate the benefits of the intervention (p3).34 In addition,
the only blinded randomized trial found no increased effectiveness forpegylated combination therapy.35 Given this, standalone correlational
reasoning in this case at best provided only moderate evidence for the
increased effectiveness of pegylated combination therapy, and this
moderate evidence does not seem to be enough to properly justify
the change in recommendation to pegylated combination therapy.
Although neither standalone correlational reasoning nor
standalone mechanistic reasoning can justify the change in recommen-
dation from standard to pegylated combination therapy, it should not
be concluded that there was insufficient justification for this change in
recommendation. It might be that the change in recommendation was
justified on the basis of an instance of reinforced reasoning. Although
the available evidence of correlation at best provides only moderate
evidence for the increased effectiveness of pegylated combination
therapy, it might be that this evidence is more conclusive when it is
taken in combination with the available evidence of underlying mech-
anisms. In particular, the evidence of a correlation between pegylated
combination therapy and improved rates of sustained virological
response is inconclusive because it may be explained by bias in the
available trials.34 However, evidence of the underlying mechanisms
makes it more plausible that this correlation is explained by the
increased causal effectiveness of pegylated combination therapy,
because there is evidence of a mechanism by which pegylation
improves the antiviral activity of interferons by prolonging their bio-
logical half‐life. In effect, this evidence of the underlying mechanisms
can help to rule out bias as the explanation of the observed correlation
(pp343‐346).3
It might be objected that it is illegitimate to rely upon evidence of
mechanisms to help rule out bias as an alternative explanation of the
observed correlation. It has already been shown that standalone
mechanistic reasoning is unreliable in this case because it cannot
determine an overall beneficial effect: It may be that any additional
beneficial effect brought about by increasing the bioavailability of
the interferons is outweighed by the reduction in biological activity
brought about by disrupting the binding potential of the interferons.
However, this problem for the reliability of standalone mechanistic
reasoning is not a problem for the reliability of reinforced reasoning,
because reinforced reasoning relies also upon evidence of correlation,
and this evidence of correlation gives evidence of an overall beneficial
effect. In particular, the available systematic review shows a robust
correlation between the pegylated combination therapy and improved
rates of sustained virological response.34 In other words, in an
instance of reinforced reasoning, it is not just the evidence of mecha-
nisms that reinforces the correlational reasoning, the evidence of cor-
relation also reinforces the mechanistic reasoning (pp341‐351).3
To sum up, there is some good evidence of the underlying mecha-
nisms linking pegylated combination therapy to improved rates of
sustained virological response. But standalone mechanistic reasoning
on this basis provides no evidence for the increased effectiveness of
pegylated combination therapy, because the complexity of the under-
lying mechanisms makes it impossible to determine the overall effect
of the pegylated therapy. Of course, evidence of correlation can help
to better determine such an overall effect. Unfortunately, standalone
correlational reasoning in this case also provides insufficient evidence
6 AUKER‐HOWLETT AND WILDEfor the increased effectiveness of pegylated combination therapy.
Although there was moderate evidence that the pegylated combina-
tion therapy is correlated with improved rates of sustained virological
response compared with the standard combination therapy, there was
still a possibility that this correlation was best explained as a result of
bias in the available trials. However, this explanation looks less plausi-
ble in the light of the evidence of the underlying mechanisms linking
pegylation with improved antiviral activity. Reinforced reasoning
therefore provides more conclusive evidence of the increased effec-
tiveness of pegylated combination therapy. Importantly, this instance
of reinforced reasoning provides greater evidence for the increased
effectiveness of pegylated combination therapy than standalone cor-
relational reasoning. Moreover, this difference between standalone
correlational reasoning and reinforced reasoning is the addition of evi-
dence of mechanisms. This shows that evidence of underlying mecha-
nisms can provide some evidence in favour of the effectiveness of a
medical intervention.4 | CONCLUSION
Reinforced reasoning involves making claims about the effectiveness
of a medical intervention on the basis of both evidence of a correla-
tion and evidence of the underlying mechanisms. In this paper, it has
been argued that a case study from virology provides an instance of
such reinforced reasoning. It has also been argued that reinforced rea-
soning is one way in which evidence of underlying mechanisms can
provide evidence for the effectiveness of a medical intervention.
Much of the literature on evidential pluralism concerns historical case
studies.8 This paper adds a novel and recent case study to the litera-
ture in support of evidential pluralism in medicine.
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